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Social values shape policy outcomes. We examine the role of postmaterialism, a widely used 
concept in the social sciences, for the mix of capital and labour taxation chosen by a society. 
Following political scientist Inglehart, we define the degree of postmaterialism as the relative 
importance which individuals or a society as a whole ascribe to non-material values over 
material things. We incorporate this notion into a simple tax model for a small open economy. 
We show that a greater emphasis on immaterial values will lower the ratio of capital to labour 
taxes. Subsequently, we test our theoretical results empirically, using a panel data set 
comprising 17 OECD countries over the period 1981-2000. Proxies for the degree of 
postmaterialism are developed from the World Values Surveys. Their impact on the tax mix is 
highly significant and goes into the theoretically predicted direction. 
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Among political and social scientists, it is widely held that a deep change in value orientations
has taken place throughout advanced industrial societies over the past decades. In seminal
contributions, Ronald Inglehart and others argue that people nowadays put lesser emphasis on
material goods (such as consumption, wealth, and income) but give more priority to immaterial
goods, such as esteem, self-expression, freedom of choice and other intangible aspects of the
quality of life (Davenport and Davis, 1999; Hellevik, 1993; Inglehart, 1971, 1997, 1999; Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005; Moors and Vermunt, 2007; Duch and Taylor, 1993).
The so-called “value change hypothesis” is largely supported by empirical evidence derived from
the World Values Surveys, the largest investigation on attitudes, values, and beliefs around the
world. In these surveys, a rising share of respondents say that less emphasis on material pos-
sessions would be a desirable change in our way of life; a growing number of people consider
tolerance and respect to be more valuable qualities to teach a child than “hard work” or “saving
money”; respondents increasingly think that, when seeking a job, a feeling of accomplishment
and working with people one likes is more important than good pay; people to a greater ex-
tent emphasize the importance of leisure and time spent with friends; people are increasingly
interested in arts, music, entertainment and culture; and respondents are more inclined to say
that the protection of the environment is as important as economic growth (see Inglehart, 1997;
Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
The change in basic values, thus, involves that people shift priorities from materialist issues
to “postmaterialist” or quality-of-life goals, as Inglehart and others call the objectives ranked
higher in Maslow’s hierarchy. Occurring on a large scale, this trend can be expected to impact
also on political decisions, processes, and policy choices. Indeed, political scientists argue that
the tendency towards postmaterialism helped to promote democracy and good governance (see,
e.g., Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and fostered the emergence of social movements with concerns
about civil rights, the environment, globalization or the “Americanization of culture” (Inglehart,
1997; della Porta and Diani, 1999). In this paper we argue that the rise of postmaterialism may
also aﬀect tax policies. Inglehart (1971) deﬁnes postmaterialism as the relative importance
people ascribe to immaterial values relative to material goods. Put simpler, it is the degree of
how little people are impressed by money. As taxation is foremost associated with a smaller
purse, it seems reasonable to suppose that the people’s attitude towards money also has an
eﬀect on how strongly governments can tax them or how elastically they try to escape from the
grabbing hands of government. Changes in the perception of the burden imposed by taxes and
in the responsiveness to taxation will then translate into changes of the optimal tax mix in a
society. Taxation will shift to those items that are complementary with material values.
This is the vantage point of our paper. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether a society’s (non-)materialistic
1attitude may aﬀect its mix of capital and labour taxation. This exercise seems especially worth-
while as the shift in the ﬁscal importance and in the tax burden from taxes on capital to taxes
on labour has been one of the most pronounced (and most hotly debated) trends in the structure
of taxation over the past decades. A standard explanation for this trend are the pressures of
“globalization”, i.e., a higher mobility – and, thus, a higher tax sensitivity, of capital (see below).
In this paper, we complement this explanation by arguing that the reduced relative tax burden
on capital may also be driven by changes in the values held in the populations.
In a ﬁrst step, we propose a simple model of capital and labour taxation for open economies
with mobile capital and immobile, but elastically supplied labour (Nash tax competition). We
incorporate the notion of postmaterialism via a preference parameter. This parametric approach
comes at the cost of some loss of generality, but allows for a reduced-form solution for the
equilibrium mix of capital and labour taxes.
As a testable hypothesis we derive that a higher degree of postmaterialism will lower the ratio
of capital to labour taxes. The intuition behind this result is the following. Both capital
and labour are elastic tax bases: capital can move abroad and labour, though internationally
immobile, avoids taxation by ﬂeeing into leisure. If people place lower relative emphasis on
material aspects, they are less sensitive to their labour income being taxed. The wage tax
elasticity of their labour supply decreases with postmaterialism. In turn, this implies that
governments increase the relative tax burden on labour.
In a second step, we empirically test our theoretical results using a panel data set comprising
18 OECD countries over the period covering 1981 to 2001. We employ a modiﬁed version of
the so-called Inglehart Four Items Index but also develop two other proxies for postmaterialist
attitudes from the World Values Surveys. Controlling for country-speciﬁc and time ﬁxed eﬀects,
these proxies, a measure of capital mobility, and a set of control variables are used as regressors
for explaining the ratio of the eﬀective marginal tax rate on capital (EMTR) to the tax wedge
on labour. The estimates for the postmaterialism parameter exhibit the predicted signs and are
highly signiﬁcant in all regressions, indicating a substantial impact of non-material values on
tax design.
Our research adds to a recent trend in the literature with focus on the complementarity between
norms, values, and beliefs, and tax policies. E.g., Alesina and Angeletos (2005) trace back
diﬀerences in the volume of redistributive taxation between Western Europe and the United
States to diﬀerent perceptions about how fair market outcomes are. Hodler (2008) points out
that diﬀerent attitudes towards leisure (in our terminology, varying degrees of postmaterialism)
are responsible for the variation in the size of welfare states and, by and large, in the overall tax
burden. Franzen (2003) and others report evidence that appreciation for eco-taxes is greater in
postmaterialist than in materialist countries. It remains unclear, however, whether this reﬂects
“merely” an increased concern for the environment or a generally reduced price sensitivity. None
2of the studies so far attempts to relate values and norms to the composition of the tax burden
or to the tax mix. This is our focus.
Traditionally, the (relative) reliance on capital taxation is explained by the degree of capital
market integration. It is reckoned that more open economies face a greater danger of capital
ﬂight. They, thus, have stronger incentives to shift the tax burden to immobile factors – which
is mainly labour, but also consumption (see Wilson, 1999, for a survey). By and large, this
argument seems well in line with the experience from the last two decades, a period that was
characterized by both deeper economic integration and a decline in the ratio of capital to labour
taxes (see Hauﬂer et al., 2008). Many of the empirical papers do, however, fail to ﬁnd a robust
negative link between capital mobility and the relative tax burden on capital and labour.1 Thus,
it appears natural to search for further factors that drive the mix of capital and labour taxation.
This paper suggests that postmaterialist attitudes in the population are a potential candidate
– and substantiates this claim theoretically and empirically.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out the model and derives predictions on optimal
tax structures. Section 3 tests these hypotheses empirically. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Framework
We incorporate postmaterialism into a standard tax model for open economies. We borrow the
main components of the modelling framework from Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), Persson and
Tabellini (1992, 2002), and Hauﬂer et al. (2008). These studies explain the relative reliance on
capital taxation by economic factors; we will put the spotlight on the role values might play.
We consider an integrated economic area with two small open economies that are identical in
every respect. In particular, they face the same exogenously given gross return on capital.
Capital is assumed to be imperfectly mobile and taxed at source. The populations in both
countries are identical in structure and tastes; individuals are internationally immobile. For
convenience, we refer to one of the two countries as the “home” and to the other as the “foreign”
country. If necessary, we shall correspondingly index country variables with subscripts h and f,
respectively. Without loss of generality we introduce model features from the home country’s
point of view.
Each country is inhabited by capitalists and workers. Within each class, individuals are identical.
Workers are assumed to outnumber capitalists. Governments, driven by (re-)election concerns,
choose policies (i.e., the capital-labour tax mix) as to maximize the utility of workers.
1Hauﬂer et al. (2008) survey the empirical literature on the relationship between the openness of an economy
and its tax mix.
3Capitalists receive income from capital (which may include income from abroad). Workers
receive only wage income. Workers have convex and monotone preferences over consumption c,
leisure – negatively represented by working hours ℓ –, and a publicly provided good g that is
ﬁnanced by domestic taxes on capital and labour.
We will interpret leisure as to reﬂect non-materialist goods and, thus, assume that (post-)
materialist attitudes are incorporated in the preferences over leisure. This assumption can be
motivated by phenomena cited as evidence for the so-called “value change hypothesis”. Inglehart
and Welzel (2005), together with others, assert that people turn their minds away from consumer
goods towards arts, music and culture or, in short, towards a “better quality of life”. As many
of these quality activities are genuine leisure time activities, it seems quite natural to suppose
that postmaterialist societies tend to have higher levels of leisure or, equivalently, lower volumes
of work. Seen from that angle, postmaterialism may be linked to the onservation that Western
European countries (which count as highly postmaterialist) experienced a sharp fall in average
working hours over the last decades (see Alesina et al., 2005).2
Speciﬁcally, the utility of workers is assumed to be quasi-linear and given by
U(c,ℓ,g) = c −
1
1 + γ
· ℓ1+γ + δ · g (1)
with δ > 1,γ > 0. The marginal utilities from private and public consumption are constant,
with the latter being larger than the former (δ > 1). This assumption ensures that workers wish
to have some positive amount of the public good even if it has to be ﬁnanced by distortionary
taxes.3
In (1), the parameter γ will be interpreted as the degree of postmaterialism. Two arguments
support this interpretation: First, the higher γ, the larger the willingness to pay (measured in
terms of material consumption) for an increase in leisure. The relative weight that people give to
non-material over materialist consumption is, however, the genuine deﬁnition of postmaterialism
according to Inglehart (1997). A higher γ implies a shift away from consumption due to a higher
marginal disutility from work. In this respect, postmaterialism is related to “laziness” in Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) or Hodler (2008).
Second, 1/γ equals the elasticity of labour supply with respect to net wages (also see below).
Higher values of γ reﬂect a reduced sensitivity of individuals to material incentives (or changes in
their budgets). This is in line with Inglehart’s (1990, pp. 176f) observation that post-materialists
are lesser motivated by income than materialists and that they earn less for the same amount
2This unrealistically rules out that nonmaterialist goals (such as self-expression or self-actualization) can be
achieved during work time. However, as mentioned above, leisure seems to play a more important role for satisfying
non-materialist needs.
3While not innocent, the assumption of separable utility is the simplest way to generate the results we are
aiming at.
4of labour and at comparable levels of education (“economic underachievement”).4
To summarize, a higher γ translates, ﬁrst and ceteris paribus, into an absolute reduction in
labour supply and, second, into a larger indolence of individuals with respect to monetary
rewards. Both aspects are included in the sociological concept of postmaterialism.
We assume that γ and changes to it are exogenous. Empirically, postmaterialist attitudes are
highly and positively correlated with economic well-being. However, as Inglehart (1990) shows,
changes in postmaterialist attitudes occur at a much slower pace than changes in economic
conditions. Postmaterialism is a cultural value embedded in society; since changes in γ should
therefore reﬂect changes in attitudes over and above those triggered by economic factors, we
treat it as exogenous.
Workers’ consumption c equals their after-tax income (w − τ) · ℓ, where w and τ denote the
real gross wage and the wage tax, respectively. Using this when maximizing (1) with respect ot
c and ℓ, taking wages, taxes and the amount of the publicly provided good as given, optimal
labour supply L amounts to
L(w − τ;γ) = (w − τ)
1
γ. (2)












Eqs. (2) and (3) formally justify why γ is a meaningful proxy for postmaterialism: First, the
higher γ, the higher the consumption of “non-materialist” leisure. Second, the higher γ, the
more diﬃcult are people to motivate via monetary incentives. Equivalently, less materialist
people are less easily deterred by monetary disincentives like wage taxes – an observation that
will drive optimal tax policies.
Domestic and foreign capitalists each own a ﬁxed stock ¯ K of capital, which they can allocate
between their home and the foreign country. Given that both economies are small, capitalists
have to receive the real rate r of return on worldwide markets, gross of taxes, independently of
where they invest.
We denote by kij (with i = f,h) the amount of capital originating from country i that is invested
in country j. Investing abroad is associated with mobility costs (with increasing marginal costs).
These costs contain all extra costs that foreign investment entails over domestic investment, e.g.,
when gathering information about legal issues, tax planning, purely tax-driven misallocations of
factors. We follow Hauﬂer et al. (2008) by assuming mobility costs M to be a quadratic function
in the amount of capital invested abroad. For an investor from h, they amount to Mh = 1
2β ·k2
hf.
4Uhlaner and Thurik (2007) empirically show that the more postmaterialist a culture, the lower the rate of
entrepreneurial activities. As they argue that entrepreneuership is associated with (the hope of) making a lot of
money, this corroborates the view that postmaterialists respond less elastically to monetary incentives.
5The cost parameter β is common to both countries; it serves as a proxy for the degree of capital
market integration between the two countries.
After-tax income of capital owners from h amounts to









where th and tf denote the rates of the source tax on capital in country h and f, respectively.
We assume that capitalists are just interested in maximizing their after tax income. They,
thus, remain unaﬀected by postmaterialist tendencies. At ﬁrst sight, this seems to contradict
Inglehart’s ﬁndings that rising postmaterialism can be observed throughout all classes and strata
of society. Yet, this assumption can be justiﬁed on several grounds: In practise, the allocation
of capital across countries is decided by professionals who, by virtue of their job as bankers
or managers, have to aim at maximizing after tax proﬁts, irrespective of what their personal
attitudes towards material goods might be. Moreover, one might also view capital owners as
non-working rentiers who live on their wealth. For such leisure-class people, increased tendencies
towards postmaterialism would not make a behavioural diﬀerence.5
Maximizing (4), the domestic capitalist’s optimal amount of foreign investment is given by
khf = β · (th − tf) =: Khf(th − tf,β). (5)
Combined with labour input, capital produces economic output. In a general equilibrium of a
competitive economy, remunerations of factors will depend on the amounts of factors employed.
Assuming that factors of production are complements, a higher capital stock would increase
the marginal productivity of labour and, thus, lift gross wages. Short-cutting that investment
decisions impact on gross wages of workers, we follow Hauﬂer et al. (2008) and assume that
gross wages vary proportionally with the total amount of capital invested at home:
wh = α · ( ¯ K − Khf(th − tf,β) + Kfh(tf − th,β)) =: wh(th − tf,β) (6)
with 0 < α < 1. Note that α being positive precludes that workers wish to expropriate capitalists
entirely when it comes to generate positive tax revenues.
Now, let us turn to the government sector. The government uses tax revenues to provide a
public good. As only source-based taxes are available, the home government’s budget constraint
5There is a more fundamental objection against the assumption of postmaterialist capitalists in our model. In
a more complete and dynamic framework, capital income would be derived from savings, i.e., from income that
is not consumed at the moment of its generation. However, we did not ﬁnd any evidence that postmaterialism
appears to be related to the postponement of consumption or the intertemporal (re-)allocation of (some given)
wealth. Rather, postmaterialism involves incentives to the generation of income in the ﬁrst place. Accordingly, a
more complete modelling of postmaterialist attitudes ought not to include “ineﬃcient” investment strategies (in
the sense that maximizing (4) is questioned). Rather, the generation of ¯ K should be modelled. However, such
intertemporal problems are beyond the scope of this paper.
6is given by
gh = τh · L(wh(th − tf,β) − τh) + th · ( ¯ K − Khf + Kfh) =: G(τh,th,tf;β,γ). (7)
The foreign country is identical to the home country in every respect. By symmetry, we get







From (8) and (9), the elasticity of the home country’s capital tax base with respect to the own
capital tax rate th equals:
εKh,th =




¯ K − Khf + Kfh
= −
2βth
¯ K − Khf + Kfh
. (10)
2.2 The tax mix in an equilibrium
Both governments are only interested in getting majority support for their politics. They are
unwilling or unable to coordinate on policy decisions with their neighbour. Since workers out-
number capitalists by assumption, governments choose a mix of capital and labour taxes as to
maximize utility of workers, thereby taking the foreign tax policy as given. The indirect utility
of the home workers is derived by subsituting (2), (6), and (7) into (1):




· L(wh(th − tf,β) − τh)1+γ + δ · Gh(τh,th,tf;β,γ).
The FOCs for the home government’s maximization problem are given by the following equa-
tions, where we use general functional forms, exploit the Envelope Theorem and suppress pa-







· L + δ
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In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the domestic and the foreign capital tax rates will be equal
(th = tf). Consequently, no cross-border capital ﬂows occur (Khf = Kfh = 0) and equilibrium
capital stocks equal initial endowments. Therefore, the equilibrium gross wage in both countries
is given by w = α · ¯ K. We shall henceforth abandon with country indexes.






7The willingness-to-pay for public consumption (on the LHS) must equal the marginal costs of
public funds through labour taxes (RHS).




α ¯ K, (14)
where we set c := 1 − 1/δ. The wage tax is always positive since we assumed α > 0 and δ > 1.
If wages were independent of the amount of domestic capital, workers would wish to exclusively
rely on capital taxes, leaving wage income untaxed. Thus, a positive value of α (generally: a
positive relation between capital and labour productivity) opens the door for taxing both capital
and labour. Similarly, the assumption δ > 1 triggers positive levels of taxation as it implies that
the economy is willing to ﬁnance the public good via distortionary taxes.
The impact of the postmaterialism parameter γ on labour taxation can be seen directly from (14):
A stronger degree of postmaterialism will unambiguously lead to a higher wage tax (∂τ∗/∂γ > 0).
Intuitively, as workers respond less sensitively to their labour income being taxed away, the
marginal opportunity costs of wage taxation become lower, too.
Using (2) and substituting for w and τ by using (14)) and w = α ¯ K, labour supply in the







Note that the eﬀect of a greater postmaterialism on equilibrium labour supply is unambigu-
ously negative. For any given tax rate, a higher γ makes workers prone to consume more of
(non-material) leisure such that labour supply decreases. This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the eﬀects
of postmaterialism on wage taxes. Due to increasing sensitivity of workers with respect to tax-
ation, tax rates rise and net wages decrease. Thus, the direct eﬀect and the indirect eﬀect of
postmaterialism via taxing wages work in the same direction.
For the equilibrium tax rate on capital, combine (12) and (13) to obtain
K
L


















The optimal tax rate is, thus, driven by two concerns (also see Hauﬂer et al., 2008): First,
capital taxes contribute to ﬁnancing the public good, which ceteris paribus calls for a strictly
positive tax rate (see the ﬁrst term on the RHS of (16)). By contrast, and represented by the
8second term, capital taxation also has the negative eﬀect of reducing wages. Thus, workers have,
for given levels of labour supply, an incentive to subsidize capital. We henceforth assume that
capital is taxed at a positive rate, presupposing that the ﬁrst eﬀect outweighs the second.
Since capital mobility, represented by β, does not aﬀect equilibrium wages (capital ﬂight is only
perceived by governments), capital taxation unambiguously decreases the more mobile is capital.
This is a standard eﬀect in open economies.
More interestingly, a higher degree of postmaterialism reduces also the tax burden on capital.
This can be explained as follows. With labour supply decreasing due to a rise in postmaterialism,
the adverse eﬀects of capital taxation on labour income are reduced.6 Thus, the incentives to
subsidize capital (and, thus, to boost workers’ wages) declines with stronger postmaterialist
attitudes.
2.3 The eﬀects of postmaterialism
Let us turn to the ratio of capital to labour taxes, t∗/τ∗: First, deeper capital market integration
drives down this ratio (since τ∗ does not depend on β and ∂t∗
∂β < 0). As expected, higher
capital mobility reduces the governments’ relative reliance on capital taxation. Second, and
more interestingly, the eﬀect of a rise of postmaterialism on the tax ratio is unclear since both
capital and wage taxes increase with γ. Hence, the eﬀect of postmaterialism on the tax mix is
ambiguous.










Figure 1: Postmaterialism and the ratio of capital to labour taxes
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the degree of postmaterialism γ and the tax ratio
t∗/τ∗. Parameters in this plot are chosen such that both the capital and the labour tax rate are
positive and, in line with reality, the tax rate on labour exceeds that on capital (i.e., t∗/τ∗ < 1).7




∂t L in (15), decreases in L.
7We choose ¯ K = 100, α = 0.3, β = 2 and c = 0.2. According to Sørensen (2000), the average eﬀective tax rate







Figure 2: Postmaterialism and the capital and labour tax rate
From Figure 1, the relationship between the tax ratio and postmaterialism is non-monotonic.
Starting at moderate levels of postmaterialism, the tax ratio increases with the degree of postma-
terialism; here, the potential of postmaterialism to reduce labour supply outweighs the positive
eﬀect via reducing the tax sensitivity of labour supply. At higher levels of postmaterialism, the
eﬀects change and the tax-ratio starts to decline. This result is also apparent from Figure 1: the
slope of t(γ) is higher (lower) than the slope of τ(γ) for low (high) levels of postmaterialism.








Figure 3: Postmaterialism and labour supply
on labor income was higher than the eﬀective tax rate on capital income in Nordic countries and in Continental
Europe, while the eﬀective tax rate on capital income was higher in Anglosaxon countries. The time periods
covered were 1981 to 1985 and 1991 to 1995. The European Commission (2006, pp. 46ﬀ) reports an implicit
tax rate on labor income of 35.6 percent (unweighted EU average, 2003) while the implicit marginal tax rate on
capital is only 25.6 percent (the average tax rate on capital and business income is even lower at 17.7 percent).
Only in few countries (e.g., United Kingdom and Portugal) or for limited periods of time (e.g., Denmark in 2004)
has capital on the margin been taxed more heavily than labor.
10The non-monotonic relationship between postmaterialism and the tax ratio can be explained by
the response of labour supply towards changes in postmaterialism. Figure 3 shows that labour
supply is converging to a ﬁxed, positive level. Intuitively, even the most ardent postmaterialist
needs a certain amount of labour income to survive (formally, the constant marginal utility of
private consumption will eventually exceed the marginal utility from leisure). Close to this min-
imum level, further increases in the degree of postmaterialism have negligible eﬀects on labour
supply and, consequently, on capital taxation. Thus, above a certain degree of postmaterialism,
the sensitivity eﬀect of postmaterialism dominates and accordingly, the ratio of capital to labour
taxes is decreasing in postmaterialism.
Observe that – with our speciﬁcation – postmaterialism does not exert much impact on govern-
ment expenditures (i.e., on the level of the publicly provided good). Using (14), (15), and (16),







1 + ¯ cγ
￿1+1/γ
. (17)
Only the second term in this expression varies (positively) with the postmaterialism parameter
γ. At low levels of postmaterialism, an increase in γ leads to a considerable increase in public
good supply. However, in the range where increased postmaterialism triggers a decline in the
capital-labour tax ratio, the variation of G∗ in γ is only very mild and convergence towards the
constant α ¯ K2/(2β) is fast. Figure 4 visualizes this.









Figure 4: Postmaterialism and government expenditures
Higher degrees of postmaterialism do not translate into substantial changes in the demand for
government-provided goods.9 It only aﬀects the tax mix that ﬁnances government expenditures.
8For consistency, we also checked whether equilibrium tax rates are such that the economy is in the upward-
sloped part of its Laﬀer curve. This is the case.
9As mentioned in the introduction, postmaterialism can manifest itself in a higher demand for cultural activi-
113 Empirical analysis
In this section we test our model empirically. Our main hypothesis is that, for a suﬃciently
high degree of postmaterialism, both a greater capital mobility and a higher tendency towards
postmaterialist values encourage governments to lower the tax ratio of capital to labour taxes.
Our analysis focusses on OECD countries, i.e., on countries which are characterized (according
to Inglehart and his adherents) by high levels of postmaterialism. Therefore, we are conﬁdent
that the collected data come from countries positioned on the downward-sloped part of the tax
ratio curve in Figure 1. We consider the period from 1981 to 2000 which was characterized
by a rise of postmaterialism (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), a deepening in capital market
integration and a decrease in the relative reliance on capital taxation (see Hauﬂer et al., 2008,
and the references therein).
Our approach is in line with some other recent empirical work on the association between closer
capital market integration with lower (relative) tax burdens on capital (Bretschger and Hettich,
2002; Hauﬂer et al., 2008; Slemrod, 2004; Schwarz, 2007; Winner, 2005). We go beyond these
studies by adding several proxies for postmaterialism as explanatory variables, i.e., by taking
explicitly into account social values. Before presenting regression results, we discuss the data;
summary information is provided in Appendix 1.
3.1 Proxies for postmaterialism
To operationalize the concept of postmaterialism we use data from the World Values Surveys
(WVS), the largest worldwide investigation of attitudes, values, and beliefs. The WVS studies
were carried out in four waves of national surveys: 1981-1982, 1990-1991, 1995-1997, and 1999-
2001. In each wave, respondents were confronted with more than 200 questions meant to detect
their socio-cultural, moral, religious, and political attitudes. Several of these questions shed
light on the valuation of non-material over material values. Using and aggregating items that
were asked in each of the four waves we construct a total of three proxies for a nation’s tendency
towards postmaterialist goals:
Adjusted Inglehart index. Our ﬁrst proxy is based on the so-called Inglehart index, which
is meanwhile included in the world values database as a ready-made variable (Inglehart 1997,
1999). The Inglehart index rests on the relative importance respondents ascribe to the following
four items: (1) maintaining order in the nation; (2) give people more to say; (3) ﬁghting rising
prices; and (4) protecting the freedom of speech. Items (1) and (3) are considered to reﬂect
ties. To the extent that cultural goods are provided by governments, this would imply a larger government sector.
In the model, this could be captured by a change in the preference for the government-provided good, i.e., in δ
(and, thus, ¯ c). However, this would require an interpretation of g as a “non-materialist” good. We refrain from
this, allowing that g may also be quite mundane.
12materialist attitudes while items (2) and (4) express postmaterialist values. Respondents were
asked to indicate which two of these items they consider to be most important. Then a score
of “1” is assigned to the respondent if both choices are materialist, a score of “2” if exactly one
choices is postmaterialist, and a score of “3” for two postmaterialist choices. A nation’s degree
of postmaterialism is then measured by the mean over all scores of the national respondents on
this scale. A major problem with the original Inglehart index is its potential downward bias in
periods of high inﬂation (then respondents will probably put the ﬁght against rising prices higher
on the political agenda more often and for reasons other than being materialist; see Hansen and
Tol, 2003). To correct for this bias, we use a procedure applied by Bretschger and Hettich (2002)
in a diﬀerent context: We perform a pooled regression with the original Inglehart index as an
endogenous variable and the inﬂation rate as an exogenous variable at the country level and
take the residuals from this regression as a proxy for postmaterialism. We refer to this indicator
as the adjusted Inglehart index.
Education qualities. Going beyond the political sphere, our second proxy for postmateri-
alism is developed from the following question about values in child education: “Here’s a list
of qualities that children can be encouraged at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be
especially important?” The items respondents can choose from include the qualities “thrift sav-
ing money and things”, “hard work”, “independence”, and “tolerance and respect”. We code
each quality with “1” if chosen and with “0” if not. For each individual we substract the codes
of the ﬁrst two qualities, which we think to be preferred by materialists, from the other two
qualities, which may be more attractive for postmaterialists. This locates each individual on
a scale from −2 to +2 with higher values signifying a higher preference for immaterial goods.
On the aggregate level, we calculate a nation’s arithmetic mean on this scale and denote this
variable by education qualities.
Future changes. As a more direct indicator for postmaterialism, we consider the following
question from the WVS: “I’m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that
might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether
you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing or you don’t mind.” Among the scenarios to be
evaluated is “Less emphasis on money and material possessions”. For each country, we calculate
the percentage of respondents who answered “good thing” and refer to this postmaterialism
proxy as future changes.
These three indexes are hoped to capture important aspects of the multi-faceted concept of
postmaterialism. We expect each of them to be negatively correlated to the relative reliance on
capital taxation, the dependent variable to be discussed now.
133.2 Tax measures
To measure tax burdens on both capital and labour, many studies employ revenue-based mea-
sures, derived from national account statistics. These measures can be easily obtained for a
large number of countries but have several important drawbacks (see Devereux et al., 2002, and
Klemm and Griﬃth, 2004). When tax ratios are calculated as tax revenues over GDP, both
numerator and denominator are driven by factors out of government control (say, business cy-
cles, the proﬁtability of the corporate sector, historical events etc). This limits their reliability
for reﬂecting government tax setting behaviour. A related problem occurs with the implicit tax
rates due to Mendoza et al. (1994) that divide tax revenues earned from one factor by its pre-tax
income. These tax rates are not linear in the “real” tax burden supposed to be approximated.10
As a consequence, a country with high tax burden might be misleadingly identiﬁed as a low tax
country.
In contrast to revenue-based ratios, measures based on tax laws give more direct information on
how governments react to changing environments. Thus, they appear more useful in our context.
For capital taxes, we use the eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR), provided by Devereux et al.
(2002). The EMTR measures the impact of tax policy on marginal investments via its impact
on capital costs11 and allows inferences on how tax policy aﬀects the size of the capital stock.
This comes close to the capital tax rate of our theoretical model.12 A drawback of the EMTRs
is their sensitivity to underlying assumptions (ﬁnancing sources etc.) and their disregard of
enforcement issues.13
To measure the tax burden on wages, we employ the tax wedge on labour income as provided
by OECD (2006). This tax wedge reﬂects the tax rate faced by a worker in the manufacturing
sector earning average income; it includes social security contributions and payroll taxes. The
tax wedge is based solely on tax laws; yet it is not a marginal tax rate, which would better
capture government-induced distortions of the labour-leisure decisions.
In the regressions to follow, we use the ratio between the EMTR and the tax wedge as the
independent variable.
10Let t and y denote the “real” tax rate and the pre-tax income, respectively. Suppose y is decreasing in t.
When there are tax exemptions, denoted by E, the Mendoza-tax rate (M) is given by M = t(1 −
E
y(t)). M ﬁrst
increases, and then decreases in t for E > 0. Only without exemptions, i.e. E = 0, we have M = t.
11We use the base case from Devereux et al. (2002) which applies to an (hypothetical) investment in plant and
machinery, ﬁnanced by equity.
12We do not use the statutory corporate tax rate and the eﬀective average tax rate (EATR). As argued in
Devereux et al. (2004), the former is relevant for proﬁt shifting, the latter for locational decisions of multinational
enterprises. Both aspects are not in our focus. However, as shown in Appendix 2, the statistical results are
qualitively the same when EATRs or statutory rates are used.
13See Stewart and Webb (2006) for further criticism of EMTRs.
143.3 Capital mobility and other controls
We follow previous studies by assuming that capital mobility is positively related to the overall
openness of an economy. We employ the composite openness measure provided by Dreher (2006);
this measure takes into account diﬀerent aspects of economic integration, such as trade and FDI
ﬂows, portfolio investments, but also restrictions on current and capital account. Dreher’s index
(referred to below as economicglob) measuring a country’s openness is scaled such that higher
values indicate higher levels of economic integration. A potential drawback of this measure in
our context is its broadness. E.g., it includes trade ﬂows which might not be associated with
cross-border capital movements. A more direct proxy for capital mobility would be the so called
Quinn 0-4 index. However, this qualitative index does not show enough variation to be useful in
ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions (see e.g. Hauﬂer et al., 2008, or Bretschger and Hettich, 2002). In line
with the model presented above, we expect to ﬁnd a negative correlation between economicglob
and the ratio between the EMTR on capital and the tax wedge on labour.
Clearly, the variables identiﬁed as crucial for the tax structure in our simple model (i.e., the
degree of postmaterialism and capital market integration), are not the only factors driving the
tax setting behaviour of real-world governments. Therefore, we control for a variety of other
factors. To capture an economy’s relative market size, we employ a country’s GDP relative to the
GDP of USA (size). Such a variable might be relevant as Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991)
show that smaller countries face a lower (per capita) capital elasticity, thus having incentives
to tax capital at lower levels. We therefore expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between size
and the ratio of capital to labour taxes. To control for governments’ ideologies, we use an index
provided by Potrafke (2008). This partisan index, which is scaled such that higher values indicate
a stronger position of left-wing over right-wing parties in government and parliament, will be
referred to as ideology. As left-wing parties are inclined to rely more heavily on capital taxation,
we expect to ﬁnd a positive correlation between ideology and the ratio of EMTR to the tax wedge
on labour. To account for budgetary pressures, we include the budget saldo normalized by GDP
(budget saldo). To control for demographic eﬀects on the government budget, we include the
percentage of the total population between 15 and 64 years (pop15to64). To capture ﬂuctuations
in the business cycle, a country’s unemployment rate (unemp) and its growth rate of real GDP
(growth), measured at PPP, are included. As argued by Krogstrup (2004), governments might
utilize the capital tax rate as an instrument of employment policy. Against this background, it
could be held that unemp negatively impacts on the ratio of the EMTR to the tax wedge on
labour.
153.4 Method and results
We construct a panel data set for 17 countries, covering the period from 1981 to 2000.14 As
the WVS studies were carried out in four waves only (1981-1982, 1990-1991, 1995-1998, and
2000-2002), we obtain at maximum four observations for the national postmaterialism indexes
during the period under study. To generate yearly values, we linearly interpolate between two
waves for each country. This imputation, though rough, allows for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity between countries, that we otherwise cannot control for. However, our data set
is still “unbalanced” since not all countries participated in every wave. If, say, a country did
not participate in the ﬁrst wave but in each of the subsequent ones, then the time series for this
country starts with the date at which the second wave was conducted. For these reasons, we
come up with a maximum number of 265 observations for the postmaterialism measures derived
from the WVS.
The statistical model we estimate is:
￿
EMTR
tax wedge on labour
￿
it
= Xitβ + ai + bt + uit.
Here, the Xit are the explanatory variables in country i at time t and uit is a possible het-
eroscedastic and serially correlated error. Variables ai absorb all unobserved eﬀects that diﬀer
among countries but are constant over time, whereas variables bt represents unobserved factors
that are identical for all countries but change over time.15 To ensure conservative statistical in-
ferences, results are presented by using heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors following the approach developed by Newey and West (1987).16
The main regression results are shown in Table 1. The basic speciﬁcation is presented in col-
umn (1). It does not include postmaterialism indexes and regresses the ratio between the EMTR
and the tax wedge on labour on the openness measure, economicglob, controlling for various the
other factors described earlier. The relationship between economicglob and the tax ratio is neg-
ative and highly statistically signiﬁcant. While result is in full accordance with the theoretical
prediction that a higher capital market integration is associated with a lower relative tax burden
on capital, we should stress that many previous empirical studies fail to produce that obser-
vation. The reason why we obtain the expected sign may be due to the circumstance that we
use a tax ratio as a dependent variable and not the capital tax rate on its own.17 However, the
coeﬃcient of the market size variable, size, is negative at a weakly statistically signiﬁcant level.
This seemingly contradicts the theoretical prediction that larger countries more heavily rely on
14The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the USA.
15To control for ﬁxed eﬀects, we include year and time dummies in our regressions below.
16To obtain HAC-consistent standard errors, we use the Newey-West covariance matrix with lag one. However,
our inferences remain unchanged when using two or more lags.
17Schwarz (2007) arrives at a similar conclusion.
16Table 1: Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
economicglob -0.31*** -0.28** -0.31*** -0.23**
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
size -0.60* -0.24 -0.02 -0.38
(0.32) (0.40) (0.38) (0.39)
ideology 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
budget saldo 0.01** 0.01* 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
pop15to64 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
growth 0.006 0.003 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
unemp -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)






observations 311 256 265 265
R2 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.92
HAC-robust standard errors with a lag-length of one in parentheses.
Stars indicate levels of signiﬁcance (* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.)
All regressions include country-ﬁxed and time-ﬁxed eﬀects. Dummies are not reported.
17capital taxes. This “wrong” sign will survive in (almost) all speciﬁcations, but will eventually
become statistically insigniﬁcant. Among the other explanatory variables, (only) the coeﬃcients
of budget saldo, pop15to64, and unemp turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant in the expected
directions.
Columns (2) to (4) in Table 1 extend the basic speciﬁcation by separately adding our various
postmaterialism indexes. Recalling that these indexes are scaled such that higher values denote
a higher tendency towards postmaterialism, all coeﬃcients show the “correct” negative sign.
Moreover, all coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant ranging from a ten percent to a ﬁve percent
level. Thus, our cultural variables turn quite successfully explain the ratio of EMTR to tax
wedge on labour.
As mentioned above, the eﬀect of size becomes statistically insigniﬁcant after including postma-
terialism measures. This might be due to fact that our market size variable is strongly positively
correlated with the postmateralism proxies:18 When omitting postmaterialism indexes from the
regression, the eﬀects postmaterialism eﬀect may be hidden in the market power proxy. After all,
size (= national GDP, relative to US-GDP) also captures wealth eﬀects, and the high correlation
between size and the degree of postmaterialism conforms with Inglehart (1990)’s prediction that
richer countries exhibit stronger tendencies towards postmaterialism.
3.5 Extensions and robustness
Appendix 2 reports some further robustness checks. Speciﬁcally, our results do not change when
we use the ratio between the EATR (rather than the EMTR) on capital to the tax wedge on
labour as the dependent variable. We still obtain a (statistically signiﬁcant) negative relationship
between postmaterialism and tax structure (see column (1) in Table 3). However, when using
the ratio between the nominal corporate income tax rate and the tax wedge on labour, the (still
negative) relationship becomes insigniﬁcant in some regressions (see column (2) in Table 3).
Postmaterialism remains statistically signiﬁcant for the tax mix after controlling for per-capita
GDP (see column (3) in Table 3). This indicates that cultural attitudes indeed exert a genuine
inﬂuence on the tax mix that is not driven by changes in economic circumstances.
Recall that we control for country-ﬁxed eﬀects in all regressions. This makes variables that
change only slightly over time – which is often said of attitudes and beliefs – diﬃcult to be-
come signiﬁcant. Moreover, standard errors are estimated in a HAC-robust way which likewise
depresses signiﬁcance. When estimating without autocorrelation-robust standard errors, param-
eter estimates for the postmaterialism proxies become statistically signiﬁcant at the one-percent
level (see , column (4) in Table 3). The robustness of our regression results is further supported
by the fact that all coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant in our basic regressions maintain their signs
and (in almost every case) their signiﬁcance when postmateralism proxies are added.
18E.g., the correlation between size and the adjusted Inglehart index is +0.35.
184 Conclusion and Discussion
Cultural values shape policy outcomes. Starting from that premise, we investigated the impact
of a growing tendency towards postmaterialism on tax policies. Speciﬁcally, we analyzed how
the relative importance which society ascribes to non-consumptive values aﬀects its choice of
tax structure, i.e., the mix of capital and labour taxation.
Postmaterialism means that individuals place higher priority on non-material goods in their
preferences. This includes both a reduced preference weight on goods other than (materialist)
consumption and a weaker responsiveness to (dis-)incentives to make money. Understood in
that way, a higher and substantial degree of postmaterialism goes along with a lower [higher]
relative tax burden on capital [labour]. People who are less interested in material possessions are
also less sensitive to higher labour taxation. Since postmaterialists put relatively lower priority
on consumption, their avoidance of taxation by ﬂeeing into leisure is low as well.
Thus, a higher degree of postmaterialism has a similar eﬀect on the tax mix as a higher degree
of capital mobility, though through an entirely diﬀerent channel. Changes in attitudes may,
thus, complement the standard “globalization argument” for the observed decline in the relative
importance of capital taxes.
Our model has clear predictive power: The rise of postmaterialist values in advanced economies
triggered, on its own, reductions in the relative reliance on capital taxation. Testing the predicted
negative link between postmaterialism and the relative reliance on capital taxation proved fully
successful: All estimates for postmaterialism parameters show the predicted sign at high levels
of statistical signiﬁcance.
Several critical points – which then open avenues for future research – have to be stressed,
though. Foremost, our modelling of postmaterialism is open to dispute. We limited the eﬀects of
postmaterialism to labour supply. Arguably, postmaterialism in a more complete, intertemporal
framework should be modelled as to also aﬀect the allocation of capital.
Furthermore, the simple link we assumed between postmaterialism and the elasticity of labour
supply has only superﬁcially been established empirically so far. In spite of the widespread
discussion of postmaterialism (starting in the 1970s) empirical studies on the behavioural conse-
quences of changes in attitudes towards material values are remarkably scarce. Still, we believe
that our way of modelling captures, in a manageable way, important features of the complex
phenomenon of dampened materialism. Moreover, our modelling of postmaterialist preferences
gives rise to hypotheses that themselves turn out to have empirical content and support. If our
empirical ﬁndings are not mere statistical artefacts but rest on some underlying causality, then
our model might be one candidate for an explanation.
Theoretically, the relationship between postmaterialism and the capital-labour tax ratio is not
monotonic, but hump-shaped. At low levels, lesser importance attached to material goods
19leads to a higher, rather than to a smaller, reliance on capital taxes. For the empirical part we
excluded this feature, arguing that the countries in our sample are, by common standards, highly
postmaterialist. Non-availability of data at present forbids to extend our empirical analysis also
to (still) more materialist countries. Closing this gap is on our agenda for future research.
Finally, we represent the [increased] importance of postmaterialist values by [the exogenous
change of] an exogenous parameter. There is some evidence (also manifest in the selection of
countries for the empirical analysis) that postmaterialism is an attitude dominantly found in
richer economies – and, thus, is at least partly endogenous. Allowing for endogenous value
formation is a further challenge – both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
20Appendix 1: Data sources and methods
Table 2: Data sources and methods
Variable Source Deﬁnition
EMTR IFS data Eﬀective marginal tax rate for a (hypo-
thetical) investment. Base case (investment
in plant and machinery, ﬁnanced by eq-
uity). For further details, see Devereux et
al. (2002).
EATR IFS data Eﬀective average tax rate for an project with
an expected rate of economic proﬁt of 10 per-
cent. Base Case. For further details, see De-
vereux et al. (2002).
nominal IFS data Statutory corporate income tax rate, includ-
ing local taxes and surcharges.
tax wedge OECD Taxing Wages Average tax wedge of a single, manufacturing
worker with average income, including social
security contributions and payroll taxes. Be-
fore 1993, it is reported biannually, and we
interpolate linearly.
economicglob KOF data Openness measure taking into account dif-
ferent aspects of economic integration. For
further details, see Dreher (2006).
gdp AMECO Gross domestic product at current market
prices (billion US-$, PPP)
size AMECO, own calcula-
tion
GDP of country divided by GDP of USA
budget saldo OECD Budget saldo, in percent of GDP
ideology Potrafke (2008) Partisan index, where higher values indicate
a stronger position of left wing over right
wing parties. For further details, see Potrafke
(2008).
pop15to64 AMECO Percentage of the total population between
15 and 64 years
growth AMECO Growth rate of real GDP, measured at PPP
unemp OECD Unemployment rate
per capita GDP AMECO GDP divided by total population
inﬂation AMECO, OECD Inﬂation rate
adj. Inglehart index WVS, own calculation Proxy for a country’s tendency towards post-
materialism. For a detailed description, see
Section 3.1.
future changes WVS, own calculation Postmaterialism proxy. For a detailed de-
scription, see Section 3.1.
education qualities WVS, own calculation Postmaterialism proxy. For a detailed de-
scription, see Section 3.1.
IFS data available from http://www.ifs.org.uk.
All OECD data are available from http://new.sourceoecd.org.
AMECO data are available from http://ec.europa.eu.
KOF data are available from http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch.
WVS data are available from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
21Appendix 2: Additional Regressions
Table 3: Additional regression results









economicglob -0.18** -0.18** -0.26** -0.27***
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08)
size 0.36 1.1*** 0.28 -0.23
(0.27) (0.33) (0.52) (0.34)
ideology 0.005 0.002 0.01 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
budget saldo 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004)
pop15to64 0.002** 0.002** 0.002 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
growth 0.0004 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
unemp -0.01*** 0.002 -0.01*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01)
adj. Inglehart -0.37** -0.25† -0.51** -0.60***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17)
per capita GDP -4.18*
(2.28)
observations 256 256 256 265
R2 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.92
HAC-robust standard errors (except of speciﬁcation 4) with a lag-length of one in parentheses.
Stars indicate levels of signiﬁcance († p < .15, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.)
All regressions include country-ﬁxed and time-ﬁxed eﬀects. Dummies are not reported.
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